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A B S T R A C T
Environmental health research produces scienti!c knowledge about environmental hazards crucial for public
health and environmental justice movements that seek to prevent or reduce exposure to these hazards. The
environment in environmental health research is conceptualized as the range of possible social, biological,
chemical, and/or physical hazards or risks to human health, some of which merit study due to factors such as their
probability and severity, the feasibility of their remediation, and injustice in their distribution. This paper ex-
plores the ethics of identifying the relevant environment for environmental health research, as judgments
involved in de!ning an environmental hazard or risk, judgments of that hazard or risk's probability, severity, and/
or injustice, as well as the feasibility of its remediation, all ought to appeal to non-epistemic as well as epistemic
values. I illustrate by discussing the case of environmental lead, a housing-related hazard that remains unjustly
distributed by race and class and is particularly dangerous to children. Examining a controversy in environmental
health research ethics where researchers tested multiple levels of lead abatement in lead-contaminated house-
holds, I argue that the broader perspective on the ethics of environmental health research provided in the !rst
part of this paper may have helped prevent this controversy.
1. Introduction
Environmental health research produces scienti!c knowledge about
environmental hazards and risks crucial for public health and environ-
mental justice movements that seek to prevent or reduce exposure to
these risks. The environment in environmental health research is
conceptualized broadly as the range of possible social, biological,
chemical, and/or physical hazards or risks to human health, some of
which merit study due to factors such as their probability and severity,
the feasibility of their remediation, and injustice in their distribution
(Bullard, 1999; Resnik& Roman, 2007; Resnik, 2012; Shrader-Frechette,
2002). This paper will discuss the ethics of identifying the relevant
environment in environmental health research, as judgments involved in
de!ning an environmental hazard or risk, judgments of that hazard or
risk's probability, severity, and/or injustice, as well as the feasibility of its
remediation, are all value-laden. Here by ‘value-laden’ I mean these
judgments ought to be justi!ed by appealing to non-epistemic values as
well as epistemic values, especially because these judgments can lead to
the promotion of some non-epistemic values at the expense of others
(Douglas, 2016; Ward, 2020). In Section 2 I draw on the literature on
values in science and research ethics to establish that science is
thoroughly, normatively value-laden. Environmental health researchers
ought to make multiple non-epistemic value judgments when they
identify the relevant environment by choosing some hazards or risks as
important to study, locating them within a causal model, operationaliz-
ing risk concepts, and analyzing their data (Douglas, 2000; Resnik &
Roman, 2007; Korthals, 2011; Elliott 2009, 2011, 2017; Shamoo &
Resnik, 2015). I argue that identifying the relevant environment for
environmental health research involves complex tradeoffs between
epistemic and non-epistemic values and requires coupling ethical and
epistemic analysis (Tuana, 2013; Katikireddi & Valles, 2015; Valles,
2018). In Sections 2 and 3 I illustrate by analyzing environmental lead
research and a controversy in environmental health research ethics, the
Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI) lead abatement study. In the 1990s, KKI
researchers tested multiple levels of lead abatement in
lead-contaminated households in Baltimore, Maryland, USA (Murphy,
2004; Markowitz & Rosner, 2013). The study was controversial because
the researchers tested cheaper and possibly less-effective methods of lead
abatement when known-effective but more expensive lead abatement
methods were available. Speci!c controversies included the de!nition of
‘minimal risk’ in environmental health research ethics (Wendler, 2004)
and the extent to which the researchers were complicit in environmental
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racism/injustice or working to improve the lives of those facing envi-
ronmental injustice (Buchanan & Miller, 2006). I argue that the broader
perspective on the ethics of environmental health research provided in
the !rst part of this paper may have helped prevent this research ethics
controversy, by encouraging researchers to collaborate with community
members to fully contextualize the environmental lead hazard.
The explicit coupling of ethics and epistemology throughout research
suggests broader roles for relevant participant communities in formu-
lating research goals and methods, a position articulated by scientists
re"ecting on ethical issues of housing-related research involving chil-
dren, especially those raised by the KKI study (Lo and O'Connell, 2005),
and standard in community-based participatory research (CBPR) frame-
works (Israel et al., 2005). While community-based participatory envi-
ronmental health research raises further ethical and logistical challenges
for researchers, it also encourages approaches to research ethics that
center ongoing relationships between scientists and participants, a
perspective Cordner et al. (2012) call “re"exive research ethics.” Section
4 concludes by discussing how such a relational approach to research
ethics for environmental health might approach identifying the relevant
environment for environmental health research while avoiding or miti-
gating possible further harms of stigmatization involved in what Tuck
(2009) and Murphy (2017) critique as “damage-centered research.”
2. Identifying the relevant environment in environmental health
research: roles for non-epistemic values
2.1. Science is thoroughly value-laden: non-epistemic values throughout
science
It is a truism that scientists are social actors with ethical obligations to
research participants and the broader society whose resources make their
research activities possible (Shamoo & Resnik, 2015). Furthermore, as
social actors scientists are implicated in relations of social, political,
economic, and technological power, raising more complicated
ethical-epistemic issues related to science's “dual nature” as a socially
situated and thus partial producer of knowledge (Levins, 1996). Both
realist and anti-realist philosophers of science agree that science aims at
some distinctly cognitive, epistemic, or knowledge-related goals or
values, for example true or approximately true theories and explanations
(realism) or empirically adequate/predictive theories (anti--
realism/instrumentalism). Indeed, Kuhn (1977) characterized scienti!c
theory choice in physics as an epistemic value judgment appealing to
some complex combination of “accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity,
and fruitfulness,” (322) where reasonable scientists might disagree about
the weight of these considerations in dif!cult cases. However, because
scientists are social actors, non-epistemic or “contextual” values, for
example human and non-human health and well-being, social justice,
and sustainability, are relevant throughout scienti!c practice (Elliott and
McKaughan, 2014). Insofar as all scientists face resource constraints, they
are forced to consider trade-offs between epistemic and non-epistemic
values. It is also uncontroversial that non-epistemic values are ethically
relevant to choosing a research topic and methodology, as such values
motivate and/or justify studying particular “problems” and restrict
methodological choices. The choice to study childhood lead poisoning is
clearly justi!ed by non-epistemic concerns about children's health and
well-being as well as environmental racism and injustice (Bullard, 1999;
Markowitz& Rosner, 2013; Whitehead& Buchanan, 2019), and research
ethics restricts permissible methods of data collection and experimen-
tation, especially those involving children and other vulnerable pop-
ulations (Lo and O'Connell 2005, Shamoo and Resnik, 2015).
Philosophical views on the normatively appropriate roles of non-
epistemic values “within” scienti!c practice—in operationalizing con-
cepts, characterizing and analyzing data, statistical inference, etc.—are
more controversial (Douglas, 2016). The “value-free ideal” attempts to
avoid epistemic pathologies related to motivated reasoning, “wishful
thinking,” manufactured doubt, cultural prejudice, etc. that can result in
some cases when non-epistemic values affect epistemic practices sup-
posedly “internal” to science (Douglas 2009, 2016; Elliott, 2017). Being
an ideal, even its proponents might agree that the value-free ideal is
rarely, if ever, achievable. Sociologists and historians of science, as well
as feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science, have long argued
that the in"uence of non-epistemic social and cultural values is pervasive
and unavoidable in areas deeply “internal” to scienti!c practice (Har-
away, 1989; Longino, 1990; Anderson, 2020). While these could be seen
as “descriptive” challenges to the value-free ideal, or the claim that
non-epistemic values often serve as explicit or implicit “motivating rea-
sons” for epistemic choices (Ward, 2020), many of these same scholars
have also challenged the value-free ideal at a normative level (Douglas,
2016). That is, non-epistemic values ought to serve as “justifying reasons”
for such choices, especially since such choices have downstream conse-
quences on important values (Ward, 2020). For example, feminist phi-
losophers of science have discussed legitimate roles for non-epistemic
values in choice and weight of epistemic values (Longino, 1995), choice
of background assumptions and conceptual frameworks (Longino, 1990),
and the development and deployment of concepts and categories
(Anderson, 2020). Notably, Heather Douglas (2000, 2009) revived
Rudner's (1953) argument that “the scientist qua scientist makes value
judgments,” since they must manage and trade off “inductive risks”
associated with different kinds of error, i.e. Type-I vs. Type-II error or
William James's) failing to believe the truth vs. believing something false
(James, 1979). To illustrate, consider Rudner's comparison between
testing a hypothesis about the integrity of belt buckles with testing a
hypothesis about the safety of a drug. The “burden of proof” for accepting
a scienti!c hypothesis (“these belt buckles are not faulty” vs. “this drug is
safe”), or the alpha-level in classical statistical hypothesis testing, clearly
ought to be in"uenced by the practical stakes, or the risks of being wrong
in different ways, and often is encoded within disciplinary conventions of
statistical inference.1 Drawing on Douglas's and others' work, a more
general version of this inductive risk argument against the value-free
ideal is roughly that (1) epistemic/methodological decisions often raise
non-epistemic risks; (2) scientists, as moral agents, have an obligation to
consider the likely consequences of their actions, including risks; (3)
therefore scientists have an obligation to consider non-epistemic values
in their epistemic/methodological decisions, a conclusion that is
incompatible with the value-free ideal qua normative ideal. In other
words, if epistemic choices have important non-epistemic consequences,
these consequences ought to be taken into account in the justi!cation of
those choices.2 These methodological decisions go beyond choice of
research topic and protection of human and non-human participants and
may include operationalization of concepts, characterization of data,
statistical analysis, and interpreting results. Thus science is thoroughly
value-laden, not just because scientists cannot insulate epistemic from
non-epistemic considerations in their work, but because they ought not.
To illustrate Rudner-Douglas-style inductive risk, consider a practical
context of environmental health research on the ef!cacy of lead abate-
ment techniques without human participants that assessed whether a
technique effectively decreases lead dust in a home (e.g. the !rst part of
Farfel & Chisolm, 1990, analyzed below). Researchers' epistemic choices
may be intended to minimize false positives, i.e. minimize the chance of
1 While some philosophers of science like Jeffrey (1956) and Betz (2013)
respond by claiming that scientists ought to simply make uncertainties explicit
to allow decision-makers to manage inductive risks themselves, this same
inductive risk argument can be extended to methodological decisions within
Bayesian statistics and “higher order” uncertainty about explicit estimates of
scienti!c uncertainty, especially in real-world contexts where scientists act as
policy advisors in non-ideal informational settings (Steele, 2012; Frank, 2017,
2019).
2 Using Ward’s (2020) helpful taxonomy of values in science, this argument
includes both the claim that epistemic choices causally affect non-epistemic
values and the claim that such choices ought to be justi!ed partly by appeal to
the latter.
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concluding falsely that an abatement technique effectively reduces
lead-contaminated dust. However decided by some combination of
disciplinary convention and conscious choice (i.e., whatever the scien-
tists’ motivating reasons or the psychological and sociological causes of
these choices), this may have non-epistemic risks, for example in
reducing the likelihood of abatement, insofar as such research might be
used to propose or guide policy and epistemic conservatism might justify
delay. Similarly, consider an “epistemically conservative” interpretation
of results that show ef!cacy of some method in reducing lead dust that
would question whether we could infer that this method would reduce
blood lead levels in children living in households abated by those
methods. This epistemic attitude also implies a particular balance of
non-epistemic inductive risks. Conversely, pursuit of non-epistemic
values like ethical restrictions on permissible methodologies will have
epistemic consequences, for example making it easier or more dif!cult to
test ef!cacy of abatement techniques. Given the values at stake in envi-
ronmental health research, it is not surprising that environmental justice
movements emphasize that the “burden of proof” should be placed on
polluters to establish that their practices are safe for affected commu-
nities, not on those communities to establish that those practices are
dangerous (Bullard, 1999; Shrader-Frechette, 2002).
Since epistemic and non-epistemic values are so entangled in practi-
ce—indeed, some philosophers go so far as to deny a meaningful
distinction between these (e.g. Longino, 1996)—the relevant normative
questions then become which non-epistemic values should be consid-
ered, and how these should or should not be balanced against epistemic
values in various contexts. As discussed by Katikireddi and Valles (2015),
categorizing variables in public health research often raises complex
ethical and epistemic issues that interrelate, requiring “coupled”
ethical-epistemic analysis (Tuana, 2013). In particular, they discuss
non-epistemic risk of promoting stigma in public health research, for
example in categorizing certain neighborhoods as “deprived,” an issue
clearly relevant to environmental public health research and one which I
return to in the concluding discussion. I now turn to the value judgments
inherent in identifying the relevant environment for environmental
health research, focusing on roles for non-epistemic values.
2.2. Non-epistemic values in identifying the relevant environment: the case
of environmental lead
As mentioned in the introduction, environmental health researchers
de!ne ‘the environment’ broadly to include the range of possible social,
biological, chemical, and/or physical hazards or risks to human health.
Non-epistemic values are relevant to which hazards are identi!ed, how
their causes are understood, and how they are quantitatively modeled by
scienti!c researchers. Resnik and Roman (2007, Table 1) distinguish
various categories of causes of environmental health inequalities, or
descriptive differences in health outcomes between people or groups,
that may constitute normatively unjust inequities depending on their
causes and a particular conception of justice. These categories, not meant
to be mutually exclusive, include physical causes (“sanitation, pollution,
geography, natural disasters, pests, physical infrastructure, housing,
workplace hazards, pesticides, diet”), social causes (“race, ethnicity,
gender … war, education, literacy, institutions …“), cultural causes
(“religion, morality …“), economic causes (“income, wealth, markets,
taxation … employment conditions”), and legal causes (“environmental
regulations, anti-discrimination laws … public health laws …“). The
sheer quantity and variety of environmental factors and their interactive
complexity in causally contributing to health outcomes and inequalities
makes environmental public health research and epidemiological
research particularly epistemically dif!cult, but also raises non-epistemic
issues in identifying environmental hazards in the !rst place, especially
when researchers' choices prioritize particular causes of health (Valles,
2018, ch. 5). It is worth noting at the outset that ‘environmental hazard’
is a concept that includes both descriptive and evaluative content, not
unlike so-called “thick concepts” (V!ayrynen, 2019). However, I argue
further that identi!cation of an environmental hazard and its location
within researchers' implicit causal model, as well as subsequent quanti-
tative measures of that hazard's risk, also ought to include non-epistemic
ethical judgments about justice and the political and economic feasibility
of interventions. As environmental health research is intended to be
useful for policy and decision-making, the inductive risk argument out-
lined above further complicates any attempt to insulate the inner work-
ings of such research from non-epistemic values. The example of research
on the environmental health hazards associated with lead paint is an
instructive example that helps set up the context for the discussion of the
controversial KKI lead abatement study in the next section. I thus !rst
turn to a brief history of the public health disaster of environmental lead.
Despite its known toxicity, in the early 20th century lead was added
to gasoline, paint, and other products, leading to a public health
disaster in the United States and elsewhere in which millions of chil-
dren suffered acute lead poisoning or the various neurobehavioral
problems associated with lower-level chronic exposure (Markowitz &
Rosner, 2013; Rosner & Markowitz, 2016; Benfer, 2017). As medical
research built up support for the claim that even small amounts of
environmental lead were toxic to the developing brain, the lead in-
dustry engaged in a public-relations campaign to divert attention and
prevent effective lead regulation for decades. By the 1960s, grassroots
community and civil rights movement organizations called attention to
lead poisoning as an example of what would eventually be termed
environmental racism (Rosner & Markowitz, 2016). After the 1970s,
regulations removing lead from gasoline and banning lead-based paint
in the US, along with some successful state and municipal abatement
programs, dramatically reduced the overall burden of lead: in a na-
tionally representative survey of the US in the late 1970s, 78% of people
ages 1–74 and 88% of children ages 1–5 had blood lead levels of 10 !g
per deciliter (!g/dL) or higher, but the geometric mean blood lead level
decreased from 12.8 !g/dL in the late 1970s to 0.82 !g/dL by
2015–2016 (Dignam et al., 2019, S13–S14). Globally, much of the
current health burden of lead poisoning now exists in the Global South
(Flora et al., 2012). However, even in the US, hundreds of thousands of
housing units built before 1978 still contain lead-based paint and pre-
sent a hazard to children, especially in the form of deteriorating paint
and lead-contaminated dust that might be inhaled or ingested due to
children's normal exploratory and play behaviors, especially
hand-to-mouth activity (Benfer, 2017). Recent surveys reveal that at
least 500,000 children ages 1–5 in the US have blood lead levels at or
above 5 !g/dL, the CDC's current “reference value” that triggers public
health response, although the current medical consensus is that there is
no safe level of lead in a child's blood (Dignam et al., 2019). Children
with low levels of lead in their blood, even below 5 !g/dL, are more
likely than their peers to suffer behavioral and learning problems,
although lead's toxic effects are not limited to the nervous system
(Markowitz & Rosner, 2013). The recent case of lead poisoning in Flint,
Michigan demonstrates that lead hazards in drinking water also persist
due to lead in plumbing infrastructure, particularly if water is corrosive
or untreated. The egregiously slow and inadequate response of
governmental authorities to the lead-contaminated drinking water in
majority-African American Flint—including outright denial of the
problem early on—was also widely interpreted as an instance of envi-
ronmental racism (Benz, 2017). The broader society's refusal to
comprehensively deal with the legacy of lead hazards in old housing
stock, plumbing, and soil by actions that would prevent exposure before
poisoning occurs (Markowitz and Rosner [2013, 1] call this “a legacy of
neglect”), and the resulting inequalities in chronic, low-level exposure
to this neurotoxin by race and class, raise similar charges of environ-
mental injustice and environmental racism (Benfer, 2017; Bullard,
1999; Markowitz & Rosner, 2013; Rosner & Markowitz, 2016;
Shrader-Frechette, 2002). Furthermore, the controversies around the
lead abatement research discussed below can only be understood
within the broader context of the history of racism in American medi-
cine and biomedical research (Roberts, 2012; Washington, 2006),
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particularly the infamous Tuskegee research scandal in which African
American men with syphilis were deceived into participation in a
purely observational study and prevented from receiving effective
treatment (Brandt, 1978).
Indeed, the health hazard of deteriorating lead paint in older housing
stock is not merely “physical,” but is also a manifestation of broader,
interacting social forces of racism, housing segregation (e.g. redlining in
the US), and poverty, with poor children and children of color suffering
disproportionate risk (Benfer, 2017; Bullard, 1999; Whitehead &
Buchanan, 2019). Non-epistemic and ethical judgments about the value
and importance of children's health and the injustice of poor children and
children of color continuing to disproportionately suffer from this
entirely preventable hazard clearly justi!es resources for research.
However, the identi!cation of lead paint dust or deteriorating lead paint
itself as the relevant environmental health hazard, as opposed to broader
sociopolitical or economic contexts implicated in the persistence and
distribution of this preventable housing hazard, characterizes the rele-
vant environment narrowly in terms of the hazard's most proximate
cause. Epistemically, this reductionist strategy of identifying a hazard's
most proximate cause makes tractable a wide variety of research ques-
tions, some aimed primarily at harm reduction or “secondary prevention,
” i.e. detecting hazard exposure as early as possible and reducing its
harms, whereas the main goal of public health research has historically
been primary prevention, i.e. preventing hazard exposure in the !rst place
(Markowitz & Rosner, 2013). Alternatively, more holistic characteriza-
tions of the relevant environment that include in researchers' causal
model of the lead hazard sociopolitical or economic factors implicated in
the continued presence and distribution of the hazard are more naturally
associated with primary prevention through political strategies of col-
lective action to in"uence housing policy or to prompt society to subsi-
dize full lead abatement. On the other hand, researchers' (justi!ed or
unjusti!ed) pessimism about society's willingness to pay upfront costs for
primary prevention of low-level chronic exposure when existing eco-
nomic incentives are such that landlords for low-income housing would
be more likely to abandon a home than pay to perform lead abatement,
may motivate narrower characterizations that lend themselves to
research on secondary prevention or even “cost-effectiveness” of sec-
ondary prevention, discussed in the next section (Lo and O'Connell
2005). Relatedly, in his recent work on prioritizing causes in population
health science, Valles (2018, ch. 5) discusses Rose's (1985) distinction
between the proximate causes of cases of disease and the more holistic or
structural causes of incidence, or differences in health between pop-
ulations. Valles argues that population health researchers should priori-
tize the latter, both because of strong scienti!c evidence for the robust
causal signi!cance of social and environmental determinants of health-
—these are “fundamental causes” in the sense of Link and Phelan
(1995)—but also because of population health researchers'
non-epistemic commitment to promoting health equity between
populations.
This all suggests that in addition to ethical judgments about the
severity of a hazard and its injustice that justify research, locating the
cause of a hazard in environmental health research implies a variety of
non-epistemic political and ethical judgments about the feasibility of
interventions and possibilities for social change (Anderson, 2020). These
feasibility judgments tied to the researchers’ causal model of the study
system are not merely narrow, technical judgments—e.g. about physical,
chemical, or biological possibility—but are partly constitutive of ethical
and political worldviews, including judgments of ethical responsibility
within relationships of power. Marxist biologists Richard Levins and
Richard Lewontin pointed this out in their (1985) defense of a “dialec-
tical” approach to evolutionary biology and ecology:
[T]o do science is to be a social actor engaged, whether one likes it or
not, in political activity.… whether the cause of tuberculosis is said to be
a bacillus or the capitalist exploitation of workers … can be decided
objectively only within the framework of certain sociopolitical assumptions
… Scientists, whether they realize it or not, always choose sides.
(Levins & Lewontin, 1985, 4–5, emphasis added)
Their provocative example of the cause of tuberculosis (TB) is not
meant to question the germ theory—the proximate cause of TB is indeed
Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection—but rather to point to the causal
roles of the broader social and environmental determinants of health in
which such infectious diseases are able to spread and cause illness,
particularly living and working conditions (L!onnroth et al., 2009; Valles,
2018, p. 114). According to this argument, researchers' causal model of
social systems implicitly encode characteristically ethical judgments of
political and ethical responsibility, both because they have downstream
effects on attributions of responsibility and arguably ought to be justi!ed
by such judgments. Indeed, one of the lead industry's main rhetorical
strategies in arguing against regulation was to blame the parents, espe-
cially mothers, of lead-poisoned children (Rosner & Markowitz, 2016, p.
324). If environmental health researchers are indeed “choosing sides”
when they identify a hazard worth studying and delimit its cause—lead
paint dust, racism, capitalism, poverty, housing policy, etc.—their iden-
ti!cation of the relevant environment cannot be insulated from
non-epistemic values.
Once an environmental hazard and relevant causal factors are iden-
ti!ed in environmental health research, the development of quantitative
measures of environmental risk—usually understood as a function of the
probability and severity of an environmental hazard—raise further
ethical issues related to both the inductive risk argument as well as
broader concerns about justice. To start with justice, while quantitative
measures of risk do not logically presuppose that there is a threshold level
of “acceptable” or “tolerable” risk, whether because the probability is
small enough, the costs of reducing the risk exceed the bene!ts, people
tolerate similar levels of risk voluntarily, etc. (Hunter & Fewtrell, 2001),
they can suggest as much because risk quanti!cation allows risks to be
made commensurable and compared across contexts, and quanti!cation
of risk is epistemically unnecessary when known hazards are seen as
categorically unacceptable. An alternative environmental justice
approach would suppose that certain risks, for example risks to children
posed by environmental lead, are unjusti!able and unacceptable at any
level, a characteristically deontological ethical judgment which may
ethically rule out certain kinds of risk modeling, risk assessment, and
cost-bene!t analysis in environmental health research. Similarly,
de!ning a threshold for ‘lead poisoning’ itself in biomedical research
involves ethical judgments. Consider that the US Center for Disease
Control's threshold “reference value” for lead poisoning that should
trigger public health action has changed several times: initially de!ned at
a blood lead level of 60 !g/dL, a level suf!cient to cause death or severe
disability, it was lowered to 40 !g/dL in 1971, but by 1991 had been
lowered to 10 !g/dL, and now stands at 5 !g/dL, despite the fact that no
level of lead is safe for children and many researchers believe it should be
set at the lowest reliably detectable level of around 2 !g/dL (Gilbert &
Weiss, 2006). While this trend is in part due to advances in biomedical
knowledge about the effects of lead at low doses, it also clearly re"ects
ethical “threshold” judgments. Coupled ethical-epistemic analysis is thus
necessary to de!ne environmental risk thresholds and possibly limit their
use in environmental health research.
Furthermore, insofar as methodological/epistemic research decisions
in environmental hazard risk analysis err on the side of over- or under-
estimating the severity or probability of a particular hazard, and such
research might be used in policy or decision-making, the inductive risk
argument shows there ought to be a role for non-epistemic values in
justifying these decisions. Johns Hopkins and KKI lead researchers Mark
Farfel and Julian Chisolm, investigators on the controversial abatement
study discussed in the next section, showed in some of their earlier work
that then-commonly-used methods of abatement were largely ineffective
and sometimes counterproductive at reducing blood lead levels in chil-
dren (Farfel& Chisolm, 1990). This particular study was an observational
prospective study or “natural experiment” that compared “traditional”
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with “modi!ed” lead abatement practices in homes with children
affected by environmental lead from paint. Modi!ed practices included
“more than minimal efforts to clean the dwelling following abatement,
dispose of debris off-site, and to protect workers, occupants, and their
belongings” (1240) and the use of a heat gun instead of torch and/or
sander on deteriorated paint. They found that traditional abatement
methods often caused greater exposure due to the generation of further
dust by abatement which was often not adequately cleaned up, while
modi!ed methods reduced lead dust and blood lead in children tempo-
rarily but not after six months (Farfel and Chisolm, 1990). These results
should not have been surprising to these researchers since Farfel was a
co-author on an earlier study showing that controlling lead dust in the
home lowered blood lead in children (Charney et al., 1983), and modi-
!ed lead abatement practices de!nitionally included better dust
clean-up. Farfel and Chisolm's decision to run this particular prospective
“natural experiment” was explicitly motivated by their assessment that
existing research had underestimated the hazards of current abatement
procedures given the persistence of lead dust (Weitzman, 2020), as well
as the political context in which only “a small number of states [had]
established upgraded abatement requirements” (Farfel and Chisolm,
1990, 1240). The researchers' characterization of the relevant environ-
ment to include comparison of these particular methods of abatement
thus not only implied the kinds of value judgments discussed above about
what sorts of interventions ought to be expected from society, they also
included judgments about the balance of inductive risks given the current
state of scienti!c knowledge about abatement. Farfel and Chisolm
compared some currently practiced interventions with others that they
believed would probably be slightly better, despite the fact that lead
poisoning could be completely prevented with provision of better hous-
ing. The researchers thus took as !xed that society would not provide
better housing, since they state explicitly that “[r]esearch is needed to
identify abatement strategies that will be practical” (1240, emphasis
added) including “evaluation of costs and health and environmental
outcomes of alternative abatement methodologies.” (1244) Their
mention of legal abatement requirements also places this research within
the context of an inductive risk judgment that more evidence for the
inadequacy of current abatement practices was necessary to draw that
conclusion for decision- and policy-makers. A more precautionary
approach to the inductive risks in the epistemology of the environmental
lead hazard may well have found such conclusions already suf!ciently
justi!ed, especially in the context of earlier work cited by—and in some
cases performed by—these very researchers.
Despite the researchers' good intentions, and their generation of in-
formation that may have been useful for some decision- and policy-
makers, from an environmental justice and deontological ethical
perspective this and subsequent research was questionable. Children in
poor-quality housing were being used to demonstrate conclusively the
ineffectiveness of environmental interventions that researchers probably
already suspected were ineffective. Furthermore, the way this and sub-
sequent research characterized the environmental lead hazard and thus
identi!ed the relevant environment re"ected what lead researcher Her-
bert Needleman later called “pseudopragmatism” (Needleman, 2002, pp.
460–461). I will return to Needleman's argument below, as I now turn to
these issues in more detail by analyzing Farfel and Chisolm's later, more
controversial KKI abatement study.
3. KKI's repair and maintenance lead abatement study:
“pseudopragmatism,” environmental racism, and the relevant
environment of environmental health research
In the previous section I argued that identifying and characterizing
the relevant environment for environmental health research often in-
volves complex tradeoffs between epistemic and non-epistemic values
and thus requires coupling ethical and epistemic analysis. Questions of
hazard identi!cation, the construction of a causal model of the hazard,
and operationalizing risk all show that identifying the relevant
environment for environmental health research is thoroughly value-
laden. This section uses these ideas to analyze Farfel and Chisolm's
more controversial KKI lead abatement study. As mentioned above,
Farfel and Chisolm (1990) foreshadowed this study in their earlier work
by mentioning the need for research evaluating costs. The ambitious
1991 Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Disease
Control report, “A Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead
Poisoning,” included both the stated goal of full primary prevention and a
cost-bene!t analysis estimating that the overall bene!ts of such a
nationwide, comprehensive program would exceed its costs by some $28
billion (Binder & Falk, 1991). However, this plan was immediately
attacked by the lead industry, real estate, and insurance interests, as well
as the usual political opponents of public spending, and even some
physician groups (Needleman, 1998). The success of these attacks is
indicative of the political environment of “pseudopragmatism” and
racism that would characterize KKI's most controversial abatement study.
While their previous study took a “natural experiment” approach
comparing cohorts living in homes that had experienced two different
kinds of abatement, this study compared environmental and blood lead
in children from families recruited to live in homes with several different
planned “levels” of “repair and maintenance” (R&M) lead abatement.
Baltimore housing organization City Homes, owners of hundreds of low-
income rental properties, partnered with the Johns Hopkins KKI re-
searchers and recruited participant families with young children to live in
the homes with different levels of abatement. Most of the participant
families came from majority-African American, historically redlined and
segregated neighborhoods in East Baltimore. Other landlords with homes
suitable for R&M abatement also participated, apparently including one
previously cited by the Baltimore Department of Health for violating
local lead ordinances (Markowitz& Rosner, 2013, p. 153)—appalling but
unsurprising given the experiment's need for houses with existing lead
hazards. It is notable that, as is common in biomedical research, the
principal investigators Farfel and Chisolm never personally recruited any
of the families. KKI developed a script used by City Homes to recruit
families, which focused on potential bene!ts of participation including
blood lead testing “at no charge.” (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. 154).
The experiment had three treatment groups with known lead hazards
and two control groups. Homes in treatment Groups 1–3 received
increasing levels of abatement costing $1650, $3500, and $6500–7000.3
Control Group 4 homes had previously undergone full abatement by the
city, and control Group 5 homes were built after 1978; these negative
controls were expected to not contain lead hazards. The researchers did
not use a control group of completely unabated homes, for obvious
ethical reasons (Weitzman, 2020). The research was approved by the
Johns Hopkins Institutional Review Board in the spring of 1992 after the
board's head requested that the researchers emphasize the potential
bene!ts to the children in each treatment group, since federal regu-
lations—45 CFR part 46, the “common rule” governing federally funded
research with human participants enacted after the Tuskegee research
scandal—prohibits the participation of children in projects with greater
than “minimal risk” in which there is no potential bene!t to the
participating children (Markowitz and Rosner, 2013., 157). By 1997,
data from 1993 to 1995 showed that the R&M interventions in all three
treatment groups showed statistically signi!cant reductions in house
dust, and while “children with very elevated blood lead levels appear to
have bene!ted from all forms of abatement, no levels were reduced to the
then-accepted level of concern, 10 !g/dL” (Markowitz and Rosner, 2013,
3 The intervention in Group 1 included wet scraping of disturbed paint on
interior surfaces and subsequent repainting, installing window well caps,
repainting of exterior window trim and interior window sills, and vacuuming of
all surfaces and windows with a high-ef!ciency particulate vacuum, and !nal
wet cleaning (Lo and O'Connell 2005, p. 43), whereas homes in treatment
Groups 2 and 3 included these interventions along with additional sealants and,
in Group 3, window replacement and additional encapsulation of exterior trim.
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161). As mentioned above, there is no safe level of lead in a child's blood,
and previous research had already shown that decreasing lead dust in
homes can decrease blood lead levels in children.
While most participant children's blood lead levels had decreased
during the course of the study, two parents of children involved in the
study whose blood lead levels increased eventually sued KKI for negligence.
In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a
scathing decision that sent the case to trial (Markowitz and Rosner, 2013).
The court accused researchers of using children as “measuring tools,” and
controversially compared the research to the Tuskegee research scandal.
They agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments that the research was actually
non-therapeutic and that parents could not consent for children to enroll in
non-therapeutic research, that the IRB review was inadequate, and that in
the informed consent process and elsewhere the researchers failed in a
duty to warn parents of potential risks. The court stated,
Otherwise healthy children… should not be enticed into living in, or
remaining in, potentially lead-tainted housing and intentionally
subjected to a research program, which contemplates the probability,
or even the possibility, of lead poisoning or even the accumulation of
lower levels of lead in blood, in order for the extent of contamination
… to be used by scienti!c researchers …. (GrimesKrieger Institute,
2001).
While KKI eventually won the case at trial, this decision of the
Maryland Appeals Court and the ethics of this research have been widely
discussed in the biomedical research ethics literature since (e.g.
Buchanan and Miller, 2006; Mastroianni & Kahn, 2002; Spriggs, 2004;
Wendler, 2004). While the study has been criticized on multiple
grounds—for problems with the informed consent process and IRB re-
view, and concerns about exploitation, for example—the main issue I
focus on here is how these researchers’ identi!cation of the relevant
environment in their study design re"ected ethical and value judgments
that were, at best, “pseudopragmatic” and at worst, racist. Pointing to
these ethical issues is compatible with accepting that the researchers had
good intentions and that the research probably bene!ted many study
participants.
Farfel and Chisolm explained to the EPA, who provided funding for
this study, that the epistemic goal of the research was to answer the
question, “howmuch—or how little—‘repair and maintenance’ had to be
done to gain what level of protection for the children?” (Markowitz and
Rosner, 2013, 149). Re"ecting on the subsequent controversy, Herbert
Needleman expanded on the epistemic consequences of this “pseudo-
pragmatic” focus on cost-effectiveness, and explained why it was actually
not pragmatic at all:
Instead of asking, ‘How can we develop a plan to spend US$32 billion
dollars over the next 15 years and eliminate all of the lead in
dangerous houses?’ [as suggested in the 1991 HHS report] the
question became, ‘How little can we spend and still reduce blood lead
levels in the short term?’ Completely ignored was the fact that lead in
excess is found in exactly the same place where jobs and decent
housing are rare. That comprehensive deleading could simulta-
neously create jobs, reduce unemployment and make [these neigh-
borhoods] livable, never occurred to the self-styled pragmatists.
(Needleman, 2002, 461)
Drawing on the discussion from the previous section, here Needleman
can be interpreted as pointing to the fact that by identifying the relevant
environment and characterizing the lead hazard and its abatement in
such a narrow way, the researchers presupposed that a more compre-
hensive abatement policy focused on the goal of adequate primary pre-
vention was neither forthcoming nor could be encouraged by their own
research. Furthermore, a comprehensive policy of primary prevention
could provide signi!cant bene!ts for Baltimore's African American
communities burdened with the ongoing legacies of housing segregation,
environmental racism, and deindustrialization, and so could address
ongoing racial injustice. The KKI researchers' implicit dismissal of this
possibility is thus arguably tantamount to complicity in ongoing envi-
ronmental racism.
The relevant environment for these researchers was restricted to the
comparison of relatively inexpensive abatement interventions on “eco-
nomic feasibility” grounds, namely that landlords would not pay for full
abatement, since this cost—upwards of $20,000—often exceeded the
market value of the homes. At the time, many homes in these Baltimore
neighborhoods were being abandoned. One central ethical question is
thus whether such cost considerations within status quo political eco-
nomic arrangements can justify research on less-expensive, probably less-
effective interventions. The use of a placebo group in biomedical research
is widely considered unethical when a known-effective treatment is
available (Shamoo & Resnik, 2015). The same issue arose during the
controversy over placebo-controlled clinical trials of the less-expensive
“short course” of the anti-retroviral drug AZT to prevent
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, conducted in countries in Asia and
Africa where few could afford the known-effective longer course of the
drug (Angell, 1997; Rothman & Michaels, 1994). As Spriggs (2004)
noted about the KKI case, “Knowing how to get rid of lead or reducing
exposure was not as much of a problem as getting someone to pay for it”
(179) and that the “value of the lead paint study seems to be that it is not
acceptable for landlords to lose out !nancially but it is acceptable for
children in low income housing to face the continuing risk of lead
poisoning.” (180)
Environmental and public health researchers reacted defensively to
these arguments. In 2005, the US National Academy of Sciences' Com-
mittee on Ethical Issues in Housing-Related Health Hazard Research
Involving Children, Youth, and Families wrote a report which attempted
to contextualize and justify the KKI research as well as provide a sum-
mary of best practices for ethical research on housing hazards (Lo and
O'Connell 2005). They include in this report a lengthy discussion of the
“economics of rental housing,” arguing:
[An] increase in affordable housing and broader requirements for
abatement of hazards would offer prospects of genuinely healthy
housing for all children … the private low-income housing market
provides limited incentives for landlords to do so. … under current
housing policies, there is a need for research to identify interventions
that are not only effective at ameliorating housing health hazards but
also cost effective. (Lo and O'Connell, 2005, 40, emphasis added).
However, whether “current housing policies” and the economics of
the private low-income housing market should be taken as given, as the
KKI researchers did in their research, or whether changes to housing
policy ought to be contemplated explicitly within research, just is an
example of the fundamental ethical dilemma of identifying the envi-
ronment for environmental health research that I am pointing to in this
paper. By the 1990s when this study was conducted, suf!cient evidence
supporting the argument for comprehensive primary prevention was
arguably already in, even on cost-bene!t grounds as analyzed in the 1991
HHS report. Farfel and Chisolm could have pointed to numerous studies,
including their own, strongly supporting the claim that to be effective,
lead abatement methods aimed at secondary prevention need to involve
signi!cant clean-up effort, and that more effort would likely yield
healthier outcomes. Resources spent on this research possibly could have
been used in experiments on cost-effectiveness of abatement methods on
dust reduction outcomes alone, in empty homes. Such information could
have potentially been used for a prospective study with participant
families comparing abatement interventions thought to be both more or
equally as effective as expensive procedures and more economical. As
mentioned above, their own previous research had shown that reductions
of lead-contaminated dust can reduce blood-lead levels in children
(Charney et al., 1983).
Finally, the KKI researchers' identi!cation of the relevant environ-
ment in the study was racist in the sense that it implied an obvious
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“double standard” of “minimal” environmental risk. The researchers
claimed that children in the study would bene!t and that they were not
exposed to more than “minimal risk,” understanding both as relative to
what those particular children were likely to experience in their envi-
ronment, not according to a single ethical standard of a reasonably safe
environment (Wendler, 2004). The researchers reasoned that since these
children were likely to be exposed to housing-related lead hazards any-
way, it was permissible to use them to test the ef!cacy of these abatement
practices, since they were likely to bene!t from them relative to their
current housing situation (Markowitz & Rosner, 2013, p. 25). This same
utilitarian-style marginalist argument was given in defense of the
short-course AZT trials in terms of a relativized “local standard of care”:
without these trials, women participating would not have had access to
antiretroviral treatment at all, so even a placebo-controlled trial would
increase their expected welfare relative to a baseline of no research.
There are several ways one might critique this reasoning, but the main
problem with it in the context of the argument developed in this paper is
that its simplistic utilitarian formulation—in particular its limited
imagination in formulating the set of relevant feasible alter-
natives—abstracts researchers away from any responsibility for the un-
derlying injustice of the background conditions. In KKI's case, the
background consisted of the environmental racism of the lead hazard in
Baltimore's highly segregated low-income housing. As biomedical sci-
entists with signi!cant social prestige, power, and access to public health
resources, the KKI researchers indeed “chose sides” in pursuing limited
lead abatement cost-effectiveness research. Instead of seeing themselves
as making marginal interventions within a !xed political context, they
could have seen scienti!c research as unavoidably entangled with po-
litical struggle, and as such partly responsible for that very political
context. Considering the institutional and social positions of these re-
searchers and the families that participated, the double standard inherent
in the research was racist even if the researchers' intentions were to
reduce harm, and even if they were successful by some plausible—albeit
narrowly construed—utilitarian calculus.
While social norms around acknowledging and confronting the roles
of structural racism in the US have shifted signi!cantly since the 1990s,
consideration of this broader view of research ethics may well have
prevented this research ethics scandal. Indeed, Needleman recognized in
1998 that an “important factor is racism” in explaining the decades-long
failure of comprehensive primary prevention: appalling racial in-
equalities in blood lead levels “due primarily to hypersegregation in
houses built before 1940” were neglected in the context of “the current
attitude of indifference toward problems of the poor and minorities”
(Needleman, 1998, 1875). The KKI research did little to address this
attitude of indifference, but rather seemingly internalized and repro-
duced it by conducting research involving a racist double standard of
minimal risk.
In making this argument, I do not mean to suggest that all environ-
mental health research on less-than-ideal interventions, or cost-
effectiveness research, is always, necessarily unethical. However, con-
trary to later defenders of research on “less expensive yet less effective
interventions,” (e.g. Buchanan and Miller, 2006, 784) environmental
health research identifying the relevant environment narrowly with a
focus on harm reduction within contexts of environmental injustice are
arguably only justi!able in the context of ongoing, collaborative re-
lationships between researchers and participants. That is, along with the
satisfaction of Buchanan and Miller, (2006, 784) conditions—a “large
population in need,” the higher standard of care being much more
expensive while a cheaper intervention is hypothesized to be “signi!-
cantly effective,” resource or political constraints preventing the distri-
bution of the higher standard, and a “high degree of likelihood that the
less costly intervention can and will be implemented on a large scale”,
along with other standard protections and oversight for research par-
ticipants, such research ought to be co-designed with affected commu-
nities, in ways that materially bene!t them and integrate broader
“theories of change” that contextualize the relevant hazard. In the next
section's concluding discussion, I turn to how relational research ethics
might pursue identifying the environment for environmental health
research.
4. Concluding discussion: relational research ethics for
identifying the relevant environment
The preceding sections laid out how identifying the relevant envi-
ronment for environmental health research—de!ning environmental
hazards, characterizing causes, modeling risk, etc.—is thoroughly value-
laden. I argued that the ethics scandal of the KKI lead abatement research
could have perhaps have been avoided had the scientists involved
recognized this and pursued research employing alternative ethical-
epistemic judgments. This section concludes by turning to alternatives,
particularly as they are articulated in environmental justice research
(Bullard, 1999; Shrader-Frechette, 2002), community-based participa-
tory research (Israel et al., 2005), and relational approaches to envi-
ronmental health research ethics (Cordner et al., 2012). All of these
approaches tend to center ongoing relationships between scientists,
community members, and research participants. Their values include a
commitment to a strong principle of environmental justice that sees equal
protection from environmental hazards like lead poisoning as a human
right (Bullard, 1999), and values the active participation of communities
in developing and carrying out research to secure environmental health.
If signi!cant community participation in designing the research is taken
to be an ethical constraint, then the fact that some participants may
derive bene!t from environmental health research on less-expensive and
less-effective interventions is not suf!cient for ethical permissibility. This
section concludes by discussing how these alternative values might be
embodied in identifying the relevant environment for environmental
health research. Particularly, how might such research, rather than
merely “collecting the data of damage” in ways that “[surveil] and [pa-
thologize] already dispossessed communities” (Murphy, 2017, p. 496)
serve instead to empower those communities?
Firstly, researchers should work with affected communities to iden-
tify and fully contextualize hazards. Anthropologist and science and
technology studies scholar Michelle Murphy points to two “tech-
noscienti!c epistemic habits” that characterize much of environmental
health science and toxicology on chemical exposures (Murphy, 2017, p.
495). The !rst is to conceive of chemicals as “discrete entities,” effec-
tively mistaking the model of abstract structural diagrams from textbook
chemistry for the chemicals themselves, which decontextualizes them by
conceiving them outside of their relational—biochemical, biological, so-
cial, political, economic—contexts. Decontextualizing chemicals allows
industry to easily “produce uncertainty about exposures” (Murphy, 2017)
by modeling risk and placing blame elsewhere, as mentioned above in
the case of the lead industry blaming parents of lead-poisoned children.
Research motivated by the values mentioned above would work with
affected communities to contextualize hazards, including their economic
and political contexts. For example, Breckwich V"asquez et al. (2006)
report on the community-based participatory research partnership be-
tween community environmental justice organization West Harlem
Environmental ACTion, Inc. (WE ACT) and researchers with Columbia
University's Center for Children's Environmental Health. Researchers
collaborated with WE ACT activists to produce scienti!c evidence of
particulate matter (PM2.5) exposure well above the Environmental
Protection Agency's safety standard, which “reinforced community con-
cerns about the disproportionate burden of diesel traf!c and bus depots
in Harlem.” (104) The study led to installation of EPA air monitors, a
complaint against the federal Department of Transportation, and an ul-
timately successful campaign by WE ACT to reduce particulate emissions
from New York City buses by their conversion to so-called “clean diesel.”
The environmental health scientists reported to Breckwich V"asquez et al.
that the research epistemically bene!ted from collaboration, as WE ACT
community activists were likely to “question … assumptions in a way
that … improve [d] the science” (Breckwich V"asquez et al., 2006)
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especially by drawing on their knowledge of the social contexts of par-
ticulate exposure. Of course, such collaborative research raises further
questions about identifying the relevant community and “balancing sci-
enti!c and community interests” (Resnik& Kennedy, 2010), not only due
to the potential for stigmatization but also the potential for scientists and
community members to disagree about aspects of study design, data
collection and analysis, interpretation of results, publication, etc. Navi-
gating these latter issues necessitates clear communication and, possibly,
prior agreements between researchers and their community collabora-
tors about various ways the research could turn out (Corder et al., 2010).
Murphy's second “technoscienti!c epistemic habit” is biomedicine's
documentation of damage to bodies caused by chemical exposures.
Again, this has the potential to stigmatize because, as she puts it,
“environmental biomedical research surveils and pathologizes already
dispossessed communities.” (Murphy, 2017, p. 496) Drawing on Eve
Tuck's (2009) critique of “damage-centered” research, Murphy goes on to
argue that, “Despite often antiracist intentions… damage-based research
has pernicious effects, placing the focus on chemical violence by virtue of
rendering lives and landscapes as pathological.” (Tuck, 2009) The pa-
thologizing and stigmatizing effects of lead abatement research are
especially worrying considering that many biomedical researchers of
low-level lead exposures like Needleman often used behavioral outcome
measures like IQ that had long been used in the context of scienti!c
racism (Gould, 1996). More germane to the issue of identifying the
relevant environment, one of the reasons why the KKI research was racist
is that by employing the double standard of minimal risk they seemed to
express tacit acceptance of the existing political environment of social
neglect and racial stigma. While it might be impossible to completely
avoid stigmatization and pathologization insofar as environmental
health research usually involves documenting “damage” or disparities in
environmental health hazards, collaborations between researchers and
communities that deal explicitly with social and political contexts,
including “theories of change” (Tuck, 2009, p. 423) have a better chance
of producing research that is respectfully framed, ethically conducted,
and bene!cial to those communities in pursuing environmental health
(Cordner et al., 2012). The case mentioned above of CBPR with WE ACT
was credited with signi!cant policy change, driven by community ac-
tivists' own highly-detailed “theory of change.” (Breckwich V"asquez
et al., 2006, pp. 105–106). To close with an example from Baltimore, in
their report on “lessons learned” in CBPR on children's environmental
health, Israel et al. (2005) discuss how childhood asthma researchers at
Johns Hopkins collaborated with a Community Advisory Board in East
Baltimore, whose role “moved from ‘advisory’ toward sharing ‘gover-
nance’ of the project,” including affecting overall study design so that all
participants received bene!cial interventions (1468). By expanding their
understanding of the relevant environment from the proximate health
hazard itself to the broader social, cultural, and political contexts of that
hazard, and including affected communities in the production and
governance of that research (Lo and O'Connell 2005, ch. 5), environ-
mental health scientists can at least mitigate potential stigmatization
involved in “documenting damage” by empowering those communities
to improve their health.
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